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Roadmap

(1) Simple theory of litigation and settlement under symmetric
information
• Divisibility of costs

(2) Why is there litigation in equilibrium?
(2) Asymmetric information theory
(2) Divergent expectations theory (“Klein-Priest hypothesis”)
• Case selection

(3) What’s so special about patent litigation?
• Externalities
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Basic Framework – Notation

• One plaintiff sues one defendant over compensation (e.g., accident,
patent infringement,. . . )
• Plaintiff’s gross return from litigation is x
• expected judgment (probability of winning times reward)
• or settlement that takes place prior to trial
• could also reflect impact on future cases; reputation; externalities

• Litigation costs cP for plaintiff and cD for defendant
• attorney fees
• effort, time, other opportunity costs
• for simplicity: constant, but may be incurred over time
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Bringing a Suit
• Plaintiff will choose to purse litigation if case has positive expected
return
x > cP
• No litigation with negative expected return
x < cP
• We will reconsider a little later.
• For remainder (and for simplicity): each litigant bears their own costs,
regardless of the outcome of trial (American Rule).
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Private Litigation Spending
• Suppose expected recovery from litigation depends on the litigants’
spending:
x = x(cP , cD )
• Increasing in cP
• Decreasing in cD

• Plaintiff’s expected litigation returns are
πP = x(cP , cD ) − cP
• Defendant’s expected litigation returns are
πD = −x(cP , cD ) − cD
• Equilibrium depends on a number of factors
• Contest function x
• Sequence of decisions
• Observability of decisions
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Private Litigation Spending – Example

• Tullock contest function:
x(cP , cD ) =

cP
cD + cP

• Simultaneous litigation spending decisions:
c∗P = c∗D =

1
4

πP∗ =

1
4

∗
πD
=−

3
4

• For remainder: assume litigtion spending is exogenous
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Out-of-Court Settlement
• If case goes to trial, plaintiff’s and defendant’s expected net payoffs
are
πP = x − cP
πD = −x − cD
• Total litigation cost cP + cD is “money down the drain” −→
bargaining surplus
• Binding settlement contract with transfer
S ∈ (x − cP , x + cD )
leaves both litigants better off
• Some questions to answer:
• For what amount will the case settle?
• Will defendant agree to settle negative-expected-value suits?
• When will the case settle? Shortly after filing or on the courthouse
steps?
• Why do some cases fail to settle?
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Settlement with Symmetric Information

• Assume same beliefs about what will happen if the case goes to trial
– symmetric information about stakes, costs, and all other relevant
parameters
• Start with positive expected value suits: x > cP
• Assumptions about the timing of litigation costs:
• lump-sum litigation costs: all costs incurred at trial
• divisible litigation costs: costs are incurred over time (both in pretrial
negotiations and at trial)
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Lump-Sum Litigation Costs: Plaintiff Makes Last Offer
• Trial in round T . Common discount factor δ. Plaintiff makes last
offer.
• Solve by backward induction
• In T − 1 (plaintiff’s offer), defendant accepts any offer that is better
than going to trial. Then:
ST −1 = δ (x + cD )
• In T − 2 (defendant’s offer), plaintiff accepts anything at or above
δST −1 . Then:
ST −2 = δ 2 (x + cD )
• ...
• Case settles in the first round for
S1 = δ T −1 (x + cD )
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Lump-Sum Litigation Costs: Defendant Makes Last Offer
• Trial in round T . Common discount factor δ. Defendant makes last
offer.
• Solve by backward induction
• In T − 1 (defendant’s offer), plaintff accepts any offer that is better
than going to trial. Then:
ST −1 = δ (x − cP )
• In T − 2 (plaintiff’s offer), defendant accepts anything at or below
δST −1 . Then:
ST −2 = δ 2 (x − cP )
• ...
• Case settles in the first round for
S1 = δ T −1 (x − cP )
The party who makes the last offer succeeds in extracting all of the
bargaining surplus
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Lump-Sum Litigation Costs: Random Offer
• Suppose in each round, the litigants flip a coin to determine who
makes the offer.
• In T − 1, parties would settle on average for
h
cD i
cP
+
ST −1 = δ x −
2
2
• ...
• Case settles in the first round for
h
cP
cD i
S1 = δ T −1 x −
+
2
2
regardless of who makes the offer
• Note: if cP = cD , settlement amount equal to discounted expected
judgment at trial
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Divisible Litigation Costs
• Suppose litigation costs are equally divided among T rounds (and
δ = 1)
• When standing on the courthouse steps, plaintiff has credible threat
to take case to trial if
cP
x>
T
• Coin flip: case settles on average for
ST −1 = x −

cD
cP
+
2T
2T

• ...
• Case settles in the first round for
S1 = x −

Ganglmair, Helmers, Love

Theory

cP
cD
+
2
2

11 September 2019

12 / 30

Divisible Litigation Costs
• Same as for lump-sum costs?
• With lump-sum litigation costs, both litigants are indifferent between
settling early and settling late. No inefficiency associated with delay.
We find multiple equilibria (any time is possible).
• With divisible litigation costs, there is unique (subgame perfect)
equilibrium where the case settles in round 1 (Bebchuk 1996).
• With divisible litigation costs there is a cost of delay and strong
economic incentives to settle early.
• Divisible litigation costs: plaintiff may be able to extract a settlement
for negative-expected value claims, when x < cP (as long as x > cTP )
Shouldn’t we always see settlement in equilibrium? (Coase
Theorem?) Why do we see breakdown of settlement?
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Why is there litigation in equilibrium?
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Asymmetric Information
• Private information:
• Plaintiff may have first-hand knowledge of level of damages
• Defendant may have first-hand knowledge of involvement in (or liability
for) the accident
• Both litigants know better the credibility of their own witnesses

• Defendant has private information about x ∼ [x, x]
• Technical assumption: assume monotone hazard rate, so
1 − F (x)
f (x)
is everywhere decreasing
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Screening Models
• Uninformed party (plaintiff) makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer S before
costly trial (in T − 1)
• “Screens” defendants into two groups:
• those who accept when S < δ (x + cD )
• those who reject when S > δ (x + cD )

• Cutoff defendant type:
S
− cD
δ
• x > x̂ accept and x < x̂ go to trial.
• Selection: Cases that go to trial have on average lower
judgments than those that settle out of court.
• Note: this pattern is reversed if plaintiff has private information and
defendant makes TIOLI offer.
x̂ =
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Equilibrium Settlement Offer
• Plaintiff chooses x̂ (each settlement offer corresponds to cutoff value)
to solve:
Z x̂
max
δ (x − cP ) f (x)dx + [1 − F (x̂)] δ (x̂ + cD )
{z
}
|
x̂
x
{z
} settlement S = δ (x̂ + cD )
|
trial

• (Unique) interim solution characterized by FOC
1 − F (x̂) − (cP + cD ) f (x̂) = 0
• Interior solution exists (and some but not all cases go to trial in
equilibrium) if litigation costs are not too high:
cP + cD <

1 − F (x)
f (x)

• Solution x̂ such that inequality. Changes in litigation costs affect
settlement and win rates.
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Some Additional Results (Spier 1992)
Consider a sequence of settlement offers:
• Lump-sum litigation costs:
• plaintiff waits until very last moment to offer ST −1 = δ (x̂ + cD )
• all settlement occurs on courthouse steps
• finitely-repeated screening model where all costs are borne at trial is
equivalent to simple model of TIOLI offer

• Divisible litigation costs
• Optimal strategy involves some settlement in each round
• More settlement in the first rounds than in the middle (“Approximate
Settlement Distribution” in Lecture 1)
• If final costs (at trial) are disproportionately large, then pronounced
deadline effect (that gives rise to U-shaped pattern of settlement
overall)
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Signaling Models
• Informed party (defendant) makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer in T − 1.
• This offer potentially signals her private information, and uninformed
plaintiff forms Bayesian inferences when deciding how to respond
• Reinganum and Wilde (1986) provide an elegant fully-separating
equilibrium:
• defendant’s offer perfectly reveals her type x
• plaintiff mixes (randomizes) between accepting and rejecting the offer

• Defendant’s equilibrium offer:
S(x) = δ (x − cP )
• Plaintiff with exactly same payoffs as at trial (→ indifferent between
accepting and rejecting)
• Probability of accepting is increasing in defendant’s expected liability
x – higher liability, more settlement
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Selection of Cases
• Defendant with private information about x
• cases that settle have higher expected liability x than cases that go to
trial
• cases that go to trial have lower win rate than the implied win rate for
settled cases

• Plaintiff with private information about x
• Patterns are reversed

• Most extreme cases are litigated (low liability with defendant’s private
info; high liability with plaintiff’s private info)
• Anything is possible (Shavell 1996). There is no selection or win
rate that is not feasible under any circumstances.
• FOC (screening model): x̂ such that
cP + cD =

1 − F (x̂)
f (x̂)

• Theory helps. Example: different contest functions give rise to
different litigation costs.
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Mechanism Design

• More general approach, encompassing both signaling and screening
models
• Some cases will necessarily go to trial when litigation costs are not
too high
• An “optimal” mechanism (mechanism that achieves the Pareto
frontier):
• selection effects from screening/signaling models hold
• more liable defendants (higher x) are more likely to settle
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Divergent Expectations
• Before information economics, non-Bayesian approach to the question
of settlement break down
• The approach here: litigants may have different prior expectations
about the outcome at trial.
• plaintiff believes expected judgment is xP
• Defendant believes expected judgment is xD

• Bargaining zone:
[xP − cP , xD + cD ]
• Settlement fails when plaintiff is much more optimistic than
defendant:
xP − xD > cP + cD
• Self-serving bias?
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Priest-Klein Hypothesis
• Special case of divergent expectations theory
• Model in which there is a tendency for plaintiffs to prevail at trial
with win rate of 50%
• This is the result of a selection effect:
• Cases clearly in favor of plaintiff or defendant are settled
• Only unclear or close cases (close to 50%) go to trial

• Litigated cases are unrepresentative of all potential cases.
• Two key assumptions needed:
• Litigants obtain fairly accurate information about trial outcomes
(high/low chance of winning for plaintiff)
• Information they receive is statistically identical (divergent expectations
through a noisy signal of the merits of the case x)
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Criticism
• Shavell (1996) uses model with one-sided asymmetric information to
show that anything is possible (here: more theory/assumptions may
help)
• Gelbach (2018) takes this to the extreme with his reduced-form
approach
• generalized form of Priest and Klein is sufficiently flexible to present
any litigation model
• Shavell (1996) itself can be represented as a generalized Priest-Klein
model
• Shavell (1996): Priest-Klein driven by accuracy and symmetry.
Gelbach: any win rate (also 6= 50%) can be observed even with
symmetric beliefs
• For any settlement rate and any win rate, there exists a reduced form
with a litigation rule that would generate those data → available data
are insufficient to draw clear conclusions about what behavior
generates the data

• For theorists: great, insights without specifics of litigation behavior
• For empiricists: forming testable hypotheses requires more substantive
assumption (the model is too flexible)
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What is so special about patents?

Ganglmair, Helmers, Love

Theory

11 September 2019

25 / 30

What is Special About Patent Litigation?

• Lecture 1: Many institutional features that add to the complexity of
litigation when patents are involved
• The possibility that a patent may be invalidated if a case is litigated:
• drives a wedge between one party’s settlement offer and the other
party’s willingness to accept the offer, and
• gives rise to externalities

• Both can result in negotiation breakdown (and litigation) even when
information is symmetric and beliefs are aligned.
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“The Settlement of Patent Litigation” (Meurer 1989)
• Patentee (with possibly invalid patent) offers one potential rival a
patent licensing contract to settle potential litigation
• Symmetric information: plaintiff does not have superior information
about validity of the patent
• Litigation here: declaratory judgment of invalidity (no infringement:
circumvents question of bifurcation – Lecture 1)
• Competitor can
• accept the offer
• litigate (with probability α the patent is invalid)
• do nothing

• In equilibrium: some litigation even under symmetric information
• The value of the subject of litigation (the patent) depends on
outcome of litigation and on whether settlement occurs (as opposed
to, e.g., land and and the question of ownership)
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Patent Litigation with Multiple Rivals
• Meurer (1989) assumes one potential rival
• Choi (1998) considers model with multiple potential entrants
• Patent holder must consider the effect of decision (settle or litigate)
on future entrants.
• Patent invalid: floodgates are open and industry profits dissipate (so:
settle)
• Patent found valid: patentee will enjoy greater protection (so: litigate)

• Equilibrium decisions. U-shaped litigation pattern
• Litigate for high and low values of α
• Do not bring a suit for intermediate values of α
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Externalities

• In Meurer (1989), externality stems from effect of litigation and thus
on value of outside option for settlement negotiations
• In Choi (1998), intertemporal externality affecting likelihood of future
entry
• Related: antitrust concerns when settlement means that a weak
patent (with high α) is not invalidated and a monopoly prevails
(litigants collude)
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